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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OP UTAH 
HAROLD K. OKUBO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE R. PARKER, 
Defendant-Respondent• 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a suit brought by Harold K. Okubo (hereafter 
Okubo) to collect an alleged promissory note in the original 
amount of $40,000.00 with interest at 30% per annum signed by 
George R. Parker (hereafter Parker). Parker's Answer 
admitted the execution of the alleged note but denied its 
validity and enforceability and asserted defenses of lack of 
consideration, payment, estoppel, waiver, illegality and 
unconscionability. The defenses of conditional delivery and 
accommodation status were tried by the court without objec-
tion. 
> Case No. 20510 
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Disposition in the Lower Court 
After a trial on September 27, 1984, the lower court 
concluded that no consideration had been received by Parker 
for signing the note, that the note was not legally suffi-
cient as a note or agreement to answer for the debt of 
another and that the complaint should be dismissed on the 
merits as no cause of action. 
Statement of Facts 
Sometime prior to January 14, 1980, Okubo was contacted 
by his nephew, Byron Okubo, concerning a possible investment 
with Sterling Martell of the Martell Corporation that would 
return 30% per year. Byron Okubo had learned of the invest-
ment opportunity from Parker who was his employer. On 
January 14, 1980, Okubo went to Parker's office to learn more 
about the investment. There he met with his nephew and 
Parker (R. 14 6) . In response to Okubofs questions Parker 
told Okubo that f,I was a substantial investor, that this was 
a broad-ranging investment portfolio that ranged from selling 
diamonds in Japan, a dry food processing company that was 
established in California, a travel agency, and other 
things. And I indicated about the investment, that had I not 
been enthusiastic, I would not have invested, and that was 
simply the conversation.11 (R.147) 
Okubo was also told either by his nephew or Parker that, 
if he invested in Martell Corporation, there would be 
2 
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collateral for his investment in the form of diamonds or 
cases of dehydrated chicken chunks to be delivered within 
90 days (R. 113-114, 148, 165, 187-188, 197-198). Because 
Okubo knew so little about Martell Corporation, he requested 
that Parker sign a note to Okubo as a favor to him. Parker 
agreed to sign an interim note until the collateral was 
delivered or established (R. 145, 149, 164, 171-2, 199-200). 
Okubo wrote out a check to Sterling Martell for $40,000.00 
which was then delivered by Byron Okubo to Sterling Martell 
who cashed the check and used the proceeds in his corporation 
(R. 204-205). None of the proceeds went to Parker (R. 148, 
167, 205). 
A note or agreement from Martell Corporation to Okubo 
along with a letter of instruction and information about 
collateral for the note or agreement and a receipt for the 
collateral was sent to Okubo within 90 days thereafter 
(R. 194-197, 207, 228, 231-232). Okubo did not respond to 
the information and took no action to take delivery of the 
collateral or to perfect any interest in the collateral 
(R. 112, 132, 151-152, 155, 165-166, 191-192). Okubo 
received a $10,000.00 payment from Martell Corporation in 
September of 1980 (R. 105) and possibly other payments 
(R. 2 25) . Some two and one-half years later, in March of 
1983, Okubo commenced this action against Parker. 
3 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
!• Okubo had the burden to prove that consideration was 
given for the note he seeks to enforce. The lower court 
specifically found there was no consideration and that 
finding must be affirmed if there is competent evidence to 
support it. The evidence shows that no money or other 
benefit went to Parker. There is no evidence to show that 
any benefit went to Martell Corporation or that any loss was 
suffered by Okubo. Furthermore, to stand as consideration, 
any intangible benefit to Parker or detriment to Okubo must 
have been regarded by the parties as consideration for the 
note and any benefit to Martell must have been at the 
instance or request of Parker. There is no evidence to 
show this0 Therefore, the lower court1s finding must be 
affirmed. 
lie The lower court did not allow parol evidence to 
vary the terms of the note except evidence introduced by 
Okubo himself and evidence to which Okubo did not object or 
to which he had waived his right to object. Further, parol 
evidence was admissible in this case to show lack of consi-
deration, accommodation status and conditional delivery as 
well as the real nature of the transaction. 
IIX« Parker signed the note only as an accommodation to 
Okubo and, therefore, has all of the suretyship defenses 
available under the law. Those defenses included (1) an 
accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated 
4 
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[§70A-3-415 (5) ], (2) The holder discharges the maker if he 
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the note [§70A-3-
606(1)(b)], and (3) The holderfs refusal of a tender of 
payment (by tendering the collateral) discharges any party 
with a right of recourse against the party making the tender 
[§70A-3-604(2)]. Under these provisions Parker either has no 
liability to Okubo or has been discharged from liability by 
Okubo's failure to accept delivery of the collateral or to 
perfect a security interest therein. 
IV. The note was delivered to Okubo subject to the 
condition that Parker would have no liability thereon after 
arrangements were made by Martell for security. Martell took 
steps to provide collateral but Okubo failed or refused to 
take delivery of the collateral or to perfect a security 
interest therein and should, therefore, be estopped from 
claiming the condition has not been fulfilled. 
V, The lower court held this to be an investment 
rather than a loan transaction. However, if this court 
should determine that it was a loan, it would be a consumer-
related loan subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code. Parker has not waived his right to the defenses, 
finance charge limitations and penalties provided under that 
Code. If this transaction is considered to be a loan, it 
exceeds the finance charge limitations, it was made by an 
unauthorized lender and is void. Okubo would also be 
required to pay penalties and attorney's fees. Affirmance of 
5 
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the lower court's judgment based on Points X, II, III or IV, 
or for any other reason, would render the arguments of this 
Point moot* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
ALLEGED NOTE AND PARKER IS, THEREFORE, 
NOT BOUND BY IT. 
As the appellant has conceded in his brief (p.6), it is 
well established that consideration is essential to the 
existence of a valid and binding obligation as between the 
immediate parties to a note. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes 
§14 3* Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, want of 
consideration is a defense against any person who is not a 
holder in due course, §70A-3-306 and 408, U.C.A. Okubo has 
not claimed to be a holder in due course. While some cases 
state that the burden of proof to establish want of consi-
deration is on the maker of the note, Olpin v. Grove Finance 
Company, 521 Pe 2d 1221, 1223 (Utah, 1974); Alexander 
v, DeLaCruz, 545 P. 2d 518, 519 (Utah, 1976), the rule is 
more accurately stated in Hudson v. Moon, 42 Utah 377, 130 
Pace 774 (1913) , that there is a presumption of valuable 
consideration upon production of the note and proof of 
signature and the duty of producing evidence to overcome such 
presumption then devolves upon the maker which, if done, 
6 
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overcomes the presumption and requires the holder of the note 
to support the presumption by producing evidence showing a 
valuable consideration but "the plaintiff on the whole case 
has the burden, the onus probandi, of showing by a fair 
preponderance of all the evidence a legal and valuable 
consideration" (at 130 Pac. 777). 
Since the lower court is the trier of fact, the princi-
ples of appellate review require this court to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 
and to uphold the findings of the lower court if there is 
evidence in the record to support those findings. Sharpe 
v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P. 2d 185 (Utah, 
1983); Knight v. Leigh, 619 P. 2d 1385 (Utah, 1980); Nance 
v. City of Provo. 29 U. 2d 340, 509 P. 2d 365 (1973). The 
lower court specifically found that there was no considera-
tion of any kind paid to Parker for signing the note (Finding 
of Fact #11, R.73, Conclusion of Law #8, R.74). That finding 
is well supported by the evidence. Okubo stated he made his 
check out to Sterling Martell (R.104, 115), Parker testified 
he received none of the money (R.148) and Sterling Martell 
testified that he used the entire proceeds and nothing went 
to Parker (R.204-205). Based on that evidence alone, this 
court should affirm the lower court's judgment. 
However, Okubo has argued in his brief that considera-
tion did exist for the note in the form of benefit to Parker 
or Sterling Martell or loss or detriment to Okubo. That 
7 
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argument is based upon a quotation from 10 C.J.S., Bills and 
Notes §148(a): 
"Usually, there is a sufficient consideration if 
there is any benefit, profit or advantage to the 
promisor, or any loss, detriment, or inconvenience 
to the promisee, provided it was so regarded by the 
parties, . . . ." (Emphasis Added) 
The underlined portion of the quotation was conveniently left 
out of Okubo§s brief o That portion is all-important, of 
course, since, if the parties do not regard the benefit or 
loss as consideration, it is not sufficient as considera-
tion, Okubo's brief discusses possible benefits to Parker 
and Martell and the possible loss to Okubo but refers to no 
evidence in the record to show such benefits or losses and 
does not even claim that such benefits or losses were 
regarded as consideration for the note by either party as 
required by his own authority. 
In fact, the evidence indicates the contrary* There was 
no benefit to Parker from this transaction. Okubo claims 
that the investment by him resulted in an "increased likeli-
hood" that Parker would recoup his own investment in Martell 
Corporation. This is pure speculation and Okubo refers to no 
evidence to support it. The testimony actually was to the 
effect that Okubofs investment would have no effect on 
Parkerfs investment (R.167-168, 177-178) and that each 
investor stood on his own by purchasing a quantity of goods 
that he could hold until a return was made by the resale of 
those goods* Each investor acted as a warehouseman with 
8 
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respect to the goods his funds were used to purchase (R.201-
203). Even if there was some remote benefit to Parker, there 
is no testimony that any such possible benefit to Parker was 
discussed by the parties. Furthermore, Parker himself 
invested additional funds after Okubo (R.168, 179-180) and 
similar investments were obtained from at least 100 others 
(R.207) so it was not necessary to obtain Okubofs investment 
to shore up the company. 
Although it might be assumed that Okubo suffered a loss 
from his investment, there is no evidence that he suffered a 
loss. He did receive at least one payment of $10,000.00 from 
Martell but there is no evidence that Okubo took any action 
to recover the balance of his investment from Martell or that 
such a recovery was impossible. And again, there is no 
testimony that any such potential loss to Okubo was regarded 
by the parties as consideration for the signing of the note. 
There is further no evidence as to the benefit to 
Martell Corporation from the transaction. Okubo has assumed 
such a benefit in his brief but has referred to no evidence 
to support that assumption. And here again, the law relied 
upon by Okubo requires that such benefit be given "at the 
instance or request of the promisor." 10 C.J.S., Bills and 
Notes §148 (b). Here also, the evidence is to the contrary. 
Parker stated that he did not solicit funds for Martell 
(R.142) and did not discuss the investment Okubo was to make 
(R.147-148). The investment was arranged through Okubo's 
9 
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nephew, Byron, who was the instigator of the investment and 
the link between Okubo and Parker or Martell (R. 108-109, 
110-111, 175, 182, 184-185, 188). 
Based upon the rules of appellate review, the finding of 
the lower court that there was no consideration for the 
signing of the note must be affirmed since there is credible 
evidence in the record to support that finding. In fact 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support that 
finding and little or none to support Okubo1 s claim that 
consideration exists. 
POINT II 
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO DETERMINE 
THE REAL NATURE OF THIS TRANSACTION, TO SHOW LACK 
OP CONSIDERATION AND ACCOMMODATION STATUS AND 
BECAUSE OKUBO WAIVED ANY RELIANCE ON THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE BY HIS OWN INTRODUCTION OP PAROL 
EVIDENCE. 
Okubo has claimed in his brief that the lower court 
erred in allowing parol evidence regarding this transaction 
because §78-25-16, U.C.Ac, does not allow such evidence. His 
reliance on that provision is misplaced since it governs 
evidence as to the content of a writing when the original is 
not available. Here there is no question as to the content 
of the note since the original was introduced as Exh-1. The 
real question is whether evidence other than the note itself 
may be considered in determining the validity and enforce-
ability of the note. There are several reasons why such 
other evidence was properly admitted in this case. 
10 
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1. Okubo himself first introduced evidence outside of 
the note. In identifying the note he stated that it was a 
note "that Dr. Parker made out for me to invest in this other 
company because I didn't trust the other company and he said 
he would back it up" (R.102). Then Okubo1 s attorney asked 
him, "Now, would you briefly tell the court how you came 
about getting involved with Dr. Parker on this promissory 
note?" (R.103). Okubo then proceeded to give some of the 
details concerning the nature of the transaction. Okubo1 s 
attorney, in his direct examination of Okubo, said, "And tell 
us about the conversation that you may have had, if you had 
any, with Dr. Parker at the time the note was executed" 
(R.104). These questions, of course, opened up the entire 
question of matters outside the contents of the note which 
Parker could explore on cross-examination as well as by 
testimony from his own witnesses. On cross-examination Okubo 
was asked for further detail about the conversations leading 
up to, surrounding and after the execution of the note and 
Okubo answered those questions without objection from his 
attorney (R.108). In fact the testimony continues for 18 
pages of the record before an objection based on the parol 
evidence rule was raised. By that time any possible right of 
Okubo to rely on the parol evidence rule had been waived. 
2. Lack of consideration is always a defense to a 
promissory note as between the parties thereto and that 
defense can only be established by parol evidence. Hawkins 
11 
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v, McElHanon, 315 P. 2d 667 (Okl., 1957). As can be seen 
from Point I of Okubo's brief, wherein consideration for the 
note is claimed to have arisen from the benefit to Parker or 
Martell by the investment of Okubo's funds in the Martell 
Corporation, parol evidence as to the entire transaction may 
be required to determine the existence or lack of considera-
tion . Furthermore, where the parties to an integrated and 
unambiguous contract place their own construction upon it by 
their subsequent actions, parol evidence of such actions may 
be admitted to determine the intent of the parties. Builough 
v. Sims, 16 U. 2d 304, 400 P. 2d 20 (1965). It is obvious 
that Okubo had not made a loan to Parker but had made an 
investment with Martell and expected a return on that invest-
ment from Martell. Otherwise, why did he "struggle" to get 
repayments from Martell from July to September of 1980 
(R. 105, 116) long before the note from Parker was supposed 
to be due? (June 14, 1981 - See Exh. 1)• Parol evidence of 
these actions is admissible to show Okubo's own interpreta-
tion of his investment. 
3S Okubo has claimed that Parker signed the note as an 
accommodation to Okubo (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) and the 
lower court specifically found that Parker signed the note as 
a "temporary surety" (Conclusion #7, R.74). Parker's only 
purpose in signing the note was as a favor or accommodation 
to Okubo (R.164, 171-172). Parol evidence as to the accommo-
dation status of a party to a note may be introduced as 
12 
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against anyone but a holder in due course, §70A-3-415(3), 
U.C.A.; Mach Lumber Co,. Inc. v. Crystal Associates, Inc., 13 
U.C.C. 682 (N.Y., 1973); James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky 
Associates, Inc.. 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1134 (Pa., 1965). 
"The intention of the parties is determinative of 
whether a person signing a negotiable instrument is 
an accommodation party, and if the intention of the 
parties is not expressed on the instrument itself, 
it must be ascertained from the facts and circum-
stances connected with the transaction and the 
parties to it." 90 A.L.R. 3d 342, Who is Accommo-
dation Party, at 347. 
4. If there is no evidence in the record that the note 
by itself was not a fully integrated statement of the intent 
of the parties, the parol evidence rules does not bar the 
consideration of other statements and writings which formed a 
part of the total agreement. See Aird Insurance Agency 
v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P. 2d 341 (Utah, 1980) , 
where other evidence outside of an irrevocable and absolute 
assignment of a passbook was considered in holding that the 
assignment was neither irrevocable nor absolute. See also 
Corev v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940 (1933), where, in 
holding a deed, absolute on its face, to be a conditional 
conveyance, the court stated, at 25 P. 2d 946: 
" . . . parol evidence, extrinsic circumstances, and 
the relationship of the parties may be resorted to, 
not for the purpose of varying the terms of the 
written instrument, but for the purpose of showing 
the object and purpose for which the conveyance was 
made." 
Those cases certainly cover the circumstances of this case 
where the note was but a small part of the total transaction, 
13 
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had no integration clause and was at most intended to be an 
interim arrangement with limited validity. The relationship 
of the parties and extrinsic circumstances clearly show 
that. Because the cases cited on page 8 of the Appellantfs 
Brief do not involve such circumstances and concern fully 
integrated agreementsf they are not applicable here. 
The lower court did not allow parol evidence to vary the 
terms of the note, except evidence introduced by Okubo 
himself and evidence to which Okubo did not object or to 
which he had waived his right to object. Parol evidence was 
further admissible in this case to show lack of consideration 
and accommodation status as well as the real nature of the 
transaction. Therefore, there was no error committed by the 
lower court. 
POINT III 
IN SIGNING THE NOTE, PARKER WAS ACCOMMODATING 
OKUBO. AN ACCOMMODATION PARTY IS NOT LIABLE TO THE 
PARTY ACCOMMODATED. OKUBO»S FAILURE TO TAKE 
DELIVERY OF, OR PERFECT A SECURITY INTEREST IN, THE 
COLLATERAL DISCHARGED PARKER FROM ANY OBLIGATION ON 
THE NOTE. 
As has already been discussed, Parker's only purpose in 
signing the note was to accommodate Okubo, That was the 
finding of the lower court (Conclusion #7, R.74) and there is 
ample evidence to support that finding. Parker stated that 
he signed the note as a favor and accommodation to Okubo 
(R.164,171-172) and Okubo stated that he made the investment 
because Parker signed the note (R.104, 127, 185, 199-200). 
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It is further obvious that Parker was accommodating Okubo and 
not any other party when he signed the note from the fact 
that the entire conversation regarding the signing of the 
note was only between Parker and Okubo(R.103-104) and Martell 
knew nothing about the note until later (R.218-219). Martell 
signed a note to Okubo himself as verification of the fact 
that he, or his corporation, was the primary obligor and that 
Parker's note was intended as an accommodation (R.205, 207, 
2 31-23 2) • Martell testified that Okubo was looking to him 
for payment and knew that any repayment was to come from him 
(R.235-236), As an accommodation party Parker is not liable 
to Okubo. Section 70A-3-415(5), U.C.A., provides as follows: 
"An accommodation party is not liable to the party 
accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a 
right of recourse on the instrument against such 
party.,f 
The party accommodated in this case was Okubo. The 
foregoing provision clearly states that Parker has no 
liability to Okubo and that result, although anomalous, is 
the holding of several cases. See Mach Lumber Co., Inc. v. 
Crystal Associates, Inc., supra; James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred 
Rotowsky Associates, Inc., supra; White v. Household Finance 
Corp., 302 N.E. 2d 828, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (Ind. App. 1973). 
That should also be the result in this case and the lower 
court has committed no error in so finding. 
Other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code fully 
support the lower court's judgment. Section 70A-3-606, 
U.C.A., provides: 
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(1) The holder discharges any party to the instru-
ment to the extent that without such party's 
consent the holder 
« © . 9 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for 
the instrument given by or on behalf of the party 
or any person against whom he has a right of 
recourse. 
The lower court found that Parker signed the note "until the 
delivery to plaintiff of security for his investment11 
(Finding #7, R.73) and as "a temporary surety until the 
delivery of security" (Conclusion #7, R.74)* Those findings 
are well supported in the record (R. 145# 149). Martell took 
action to deliver collateral to Okubo (R.194-197, 207, 228, 
231-232) but Okubo did not respond and took no action to take 
delivery of the collateral or to perfect any security 
interest therein (R.112, 132, 151-152, 155, 165-166, 191-
192)
 e He was informed that the collateral would be stored 
for him if he so desired (R.192, 195, 232-233) but he did 
nothing to verify or agree to that arrangement. The lower 
court sustained Okubofs objection to a question asked to 
determine if the collateral was still available (R.236). 
Okubo was well aware that he was to receive collateral 
for his investment (R.112, 165) and that Parker's note was to 
be in effect only until the collateral could be arranged. 
His failure to take any steps to accept the collateral or to 
perfect an interest in it was not only contrary to the 
agreement between Parker and Okubo but also an impairment of 
the collateral which discharged any obligation of Parker to 
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him as provided by §70A-3-606(l) (b) , U.C.A. If Parker had 
any obligation to Okubo on the note and paid that note, he 
would have the right to be subrogated to Okubo fs rights in 
the collateral to secure his own outlay of funds. Okubofs 
failure to protect that collateral has prejudiced Parker's 
position and Okubo should not be allowed to pass the conse-
quences of his own failures on to Parker, That is the 
principle underlying that section and the resulting discharge 
of Parker is fair, reasonable and required by the law. See 
Farmers State Bank of Oakley v. Cooper, 227 Kan. 547, 608 
P. 2d 929 (1980) . This impairment of collateral defense is 
available even if the collateral is not in the possession or 
control of Okubo. Beneficial Finance Co. of Norman v. 
Marshall, 551 P. 2d 315 (Okl. app. 1976). 
Another view of this transaction is that Parker's note 
to Okubo was to be considered paid upon delivery of, or 
perfection of an interest in, the collateral. That is 
consistent with the understanding of the parties. Section 
70A-3-604, U.C.A., provides: 
"(1) Any party making tender of full payment to a 
holder when or after it is due is discharged to the 
extent of all subsequent liability for interest, 
costs and attorney's fees. 
(2) The holder's refusal of such tender wholly 
discharges any party who has a right of recourse 
against the party making the tender." 
Under §70A-3-415(5), U.C.A., quoted above, Parker would have 
recourse against Martell if it was determined that Martell 
was the party accommodated. Martell made a tender of the 
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collateral to Okubo which, pursuant to the condition under 
which Parker signed the note, represented a "tender of full 
payment" to Okubo„ Okubo's refusal of that tender "wholly 
discharges" Parker under §70A-3-604(2)• 
POINT IV 
PARKER SIGNED THE NOTE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION 
THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED PROM LIABILITY WHEN 
COLLATERAL FOR THE NOTE WAS ARRANGED. THAT 
CONDITION WAS FULFILLED AND PARKER WAS# THEREFORE, 
RELEASED« 
As is established by the evidence and the findings 
referred to in Point III, supra, Parker signed the note 
"until the delivery to plaintiff fo security for his invest-
ment" and as "a temporary surety until the delivery of 
security" (Finding #7, R*73, Conclusion #7, R.74). That 
constitutes conditional delivery. When the condition was 
fulfilled by arrangements for the security, Parker was no 
longer obligated on the note. In Martineau v, Hanson, 47 
Utah 549, 155 Pac* 432 (1916), a note was not to become due 
until the maker received a payment from a third party* In 
holding the note to be unenforceable, this court stated (at 
155 Pace 435): 
"The question was not one of want of, or failure 
of, consideration. The question was whether the 
note in question was conditionally delivered or 
note If it was delivered upon a condition prece-
dent and the condition was not fulfilled, then the 
note did not constitute an enforceable contract, 
and that is the end of the matter•" 
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In this case the note was delivered upon a condition subse-
quent and that condition was fulfilled. The same principle 
applies and the note was no longer an enforceable contract. 
The fact that Okubo did not actually take delivery of 
the collateral was a result of his own failure or refusal. 
Everything was done for him. He needed only accept the 
collateral or take steps to perfect a security interest 
therein. Under the law he is estopped from claiming any 
advantage based on his own failure. Therefore, the collater-
al must be deemed to have been delivered and the condition on 
which the note was given fulfilled. Parker was no longer 
bound by the conditional note. 
POINT V 
IP THIS WAS A LOAN TRANSACTION, RATHER THAN AN 
INVESTMENT AS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER COURT, IT WAS 
A CONSUMER-RELATED LOAN SUBJECT TO THE UTAH UNIFORM 
CREDIT CODE AND, AS SUCH VOID, UNCONSCIONABLE, AND 
SUBJECT TO INTEREST LIMITATIONS AND PENALTIES. 
Since Okubo sued to recover on a promissory note given 
for funds which he had loaned, Parker raised defenses under 
the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The lower court held 
that this transaction was not a loan and was not subject to 
the Utah Uniform Credit Code (Conclusions #2, 3 and 4, 
R.74). Okubo himself claimed it was an investment and not a 
loan (R.199-200) and objected to the characterization of the 
transaction as a loan (R.119,191). In view of the holding of 
the lower court, the evidence and arguments of Parker 
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regarding the Consumer Credit Code defenses need not be 
considered. However, if it is determined that Parker has any 
liability at all, it would have to be based on a conclusion 
that this was a loan transaction and these defenses would 
become relevanto These defenses will be only briefly 
mentioned here* 
The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, at the time this 
note was signed, governed not just consumer loans but 
consumer-related loans, §70B-3~602,U.C«,Ae, on which finance 
charges may not exceed 18% per annum. This note called for 
interest of 30% per annum which would constitute a violation 
of the code. Loans carrying finance charges in excess of 18% 
per annum made by unauthorized lenders are void, §70B-5-202 
(2) « Violations of the code subject the creditor to penal-
ties up to ten times the amount of any excess charges, 
§70B-5-202(4), and to payment of attorneyfs fees incurred by 
the debtor, §70B-5-202(8). If the terms of the note are 
found to be unconscionable, the court may refuse to enforce 
it, §70B-5~108(1), and may award a penalty of $5,000*00 plus 
attorneyfs fees, §70B-5-108(4). 
In the interest of brevity, further discussion of these 
issues is not considered necessary. However, Parker has not 
waived his rights under the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
and is entitled to a full consideration of them in the event 
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this court should not affirm the lower court's judgment based 
on the arguments in Points I, II, III or IV above or for any 
other reason. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court found there was no consideration for the 
note. There is competent evidence in the record to support 
that finding and, therefore, under the principles of appel-
late review, it must be upheld. 
Parol evidence was properly admitted in this case 
because Okubo first introduced such evidence and opened up 
the whole area of extrinsic evidence to cross-examination and 
clarification by Parkerfs own witnesses. Parol evidence is 
also admissible to show lack of consideration, accommodation 
status, conditional delivery and the true nature of the 
transaction. There was no integration clause in the note and 
the parties did not intend the note to be an integration of 
their total agreement which would preclude the admission of 
parol evidence. 
The note was obviously signed only as an accommodation 
to Okubo which renders Parker, by statute, not liable to 
Okubo. Further, if Parker had any liability to Okubo, he was 
discharged from such liability by Okubofs impairment of the 
collateral and refusal to accept delivery of the collateral 
or to perfect a security interest therein. 
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The note was delivered to Okubo subject to the condition 
that security be provided* That condition was fulfilled when 
Mart ell attempted to deliver collateral to Okubo. Okubo *s 
failure to take delivery of the collateral or perfect any 
security interest therein estops him from claiming the 
condition was not fulfilled• The note was, then, no longer 
enforceable. 
This transaction was an investment by Okubo, not a 
loan* However, if it were considered to be a loan, Parker is 
entitled to all of the defenses and benefits available under 
the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Those benefits would 
render the note void and unenforceable and subject Okubo to 
the payment of penalties and attorney's fees. In that event 
Parker would want the opportunity to brief those issues in 
more detail* 
The lower courtfs judgment is well-supported in the 
record and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph Ju Mahrsh 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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